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Building on real options literature, this study shows that the use of a staged
approach for the management of innovation projects affects the innovation
output of firms differently depending on firm characteristics and ambitions.
In particular, while staged project management increases the effect of inno-
vation expenditures on new product sales for firms envisaging incremental
or continuous innovations, this moderating effect is absent for firms aspiring
radical innovations. In addition, while staged project management has a pos-
itive moderating effect in firms with resource slack, this is not the case when
firms are resource-constrained. We further investigate the underlying mecha-
nisms to this latter finding by demonstrating that in resource-abundant firms
staged project organization is associated with delaying projects until more
information becomes available. Thereby these firms reap the waiting value
inherent to real options reasoning. By contrast, resource-constrained firms
using staged project management are shown to abandon a larger share of
their innovation projects and to concentrate resources on fewer projects. It
appears, however, that, due to budgetary pressure, they make the decision
to abandon at a too early stage where uncertainty is insufficiently resolved.
This can explain why there is no effect of staged project management on the
sales of resource-constrained firms from new products. The paper contributes
to theory development on when and why the staging of innovation projects
affects the innovation output of firms and to the literature on real options
reasoning in general.
Key words: staging of innovation projects, real options theory, new product
development process, ressource allocation, innovation portfolios
JEL classification: O32, M
∗Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. e-mail: petra.andries@ugent.be
†KU Leuven, Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation
‡Centre for European Economic Research, Department of Industrial Economics and International Man-
agement
1
1. INTRODUCTION
For firms to survive in the long run, the development and commercialization of new
products and services are essential. Even in tough economic and budgetary times, firms
have to keep investing in innovation projects of which the outcome is often highly uncer-
tain (Hauser et al., 2006; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). The organization and financing
of innovation projects in different stages is widely accepted – both in academic literature
and in practice – as the preeminent way of managing and even benefiting from uncertain
opportunities while keeping costs under control (Cooper, 2008).
Surprisingly however, empirical evidence on the performance effect of staging innova-
tion projects is scarce. On the one hand, the innovation economics literature investigates
the relationship between innovation expenditures and innovation output without taking
project organization and project financing into account (see also Klingebiel and Ram-
mer, 2014). On the other hand, the innovation management literature elaborates on the
potential advantages and limitations of staging innovation projects (Ettlie and Elsen-
bach, 2007; Oorschot et al., 2010; Biazzo, 2009) and shows that an increasing number of
firms have formalized their project management processes as a staged process (Griffin,
1997; Barczak et al., 2009). However, quantitative evidence on the impact of staged
project management on firms’ innovation output is largely absent. As a result, it is
still unclear whether and, perhaps even more importantly, under which conditions the
staging of innovation projects makes sense.
The goal of this paper is therefore to empirically examine whether and under which
conditions the staging of innovation projects moderates the relationship between firms’
investments in innovation and their innovation output, and in particular on sales from
new products. It thereby contributes to a growing stream of literature aiming to uncover
how differences in innovation management and strategy contribute to the innovation
output of firms (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014).
The basic principle of staged project management is that projects only proceed to
subsequent stages if certain predefined criteria, mostly related to technological feasibility,
costs, and market response are met. Only projects that pass these gates receive follow-
up financing. Staged project management hence allows firms to postpone commitment
until a potentially substantial portion of the uncertainty about the opportunity has been
resolved (Adner and Levinthal, 2004). In that respect, staging innovation projects is very
similar to buying a series of options on an investment (Cooper, 2008). It offers the firm
the value of waiting for additional information before investing more, and the value of
abandoning projects that turn out to be insufficiently promising.
However, the literature suggests that the organization of innovation projects in stages
also has several limitations. First, the approach entails a significant risk of killing po-
tentially “right” projects at the early gates (Oorschot et al., 2010), whereas with slightly
more time and resources, these may have been met and the project may have turned to
become very successful (Adner and Levinthal, 2004). Secondly, abandoning innovation
projects at an early stage reduces the odds of discovering a wide variety of related oppor-
tunities. Unsuccessful experiments do not only provide information on their viability, but
may also lead to the discovery of unforeseen opportunities (Adner and Levinthal, 2004).
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In line with a large body of research pointing to the need for a contingent approach in
the design of new product development processes (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Shenhar
and Dvir, 1996; for an overview see Biazzo, 2009), it makes sense to investigate not
only whether the staging of innovation processes positively moderates the relationship
between firms’ investments in innovation and their innovation output, but also under
which circumstances this is the case.
In particular, we hypothesize that the positive moderating effect of staging innovation
projects is smaller for resource-constrained firms and for firms envisaging more radical
innovations. We test these hypotheses by combining credit rating information with data
from two waves of the German section of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), which
is an official survey by the European Commission launched across Europe. These data are
suitable since they include the sales from new products as a measure of innovation output.
In addition to the standard catalog of CIS questions, these two editions also include
questions on the management of innovation projects, and in particular on whether these
projects are organized and financed in stages.
Our analyses demonstrate that the staging of innovation projects strengthens the ef-
fect of innovation expenditures on new product sales in firms with resource slack, but not
in resource-constrained firms. A further investigation shows that in resource-abundant
firms the staging of innovation project is associated with delaying projects. This indicates
that they postpone decisions until more information becomes available, thereby reaping
the option value inherent in waiting. By contrast, resource-constrained firms that use
staged project management abandon individual projects more frequently and thereby
focus resources on a lower number of projects. This selection of projects is, however,
ineffective in stimulating innovation output, which suggests that, because of budgetary
pressure, resource-constrained firms need to decide on abandonment at points in time
when uncertainty is insufficiently resolved. Resource-constrained firms are thereby not
able to capture the option value of abandonment. In addition, while the moderating
effect of staging innovation projects is significantly positive for firms envisaging incre-
mental or continuous innovations, the predetermined milestones and criteria inherent to
staged project management are apparently less appropriate for developing more radical
innovations. Firms envisaging radical innovations do not benefit from staging their inno-
vation projects. Overall, staged project management only works for resource-abundant
firms that aspire incremental innovations.
This study contributes to theory development in the area of innovation management
and real options reasoning by delineating how differences in the management of inno-
vation projects explain variances in the innovation output of firms. In particular, we
theorize how the staging of innovation projects moderates the translation of innovation
expenditures into innovation output, and how this moderating effect depends on resource
availability and on the radicalness of the envisaged innovations. Our findings have im-
portant implications for resource-constrained as well as resource-abundant firms aiming
to optimize their innovation processes.
In the remainder of the paper we review the literature to develop our hypotheses. We
then explain the empirical approach and results and conclude with a discussion of the
implications of our study for theory and practice.
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2. LITERATURE AND BACKGROUND
As an essential determinant of long-run survival, the development and commercialization
of new products and services will constitute a substantial share of firms’ investments.
According to Klingebiel and Rammer (2014, pp. 248), “the success of a firm’s suite of
innovative activities is a function of the amount and quality of resources dedicated to
the task”. However, even more than the injection of resources into innovation activities,
the way these innovation expenditures are employed will determine to which extent
a firm succeeds in the commercialization of innovation activities. This study adds to a
growing stream of literature aiming to uncover how differences in innovation management
and strategy contribute to the innovation output of firms (Laursen and Salter, 2006;
Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014). In particular, it investigates whether the staging of
innovation projects allows a firm to reap better results from investments in innovation.
However, assuming that the staging of innovation projects has the same effect in all
firms and for all types of innovations would be a rash conclusion. As summarized by
Biazzo (2009), a large body of research has pointed to the need for a contingent approach
in the design of new product development processes, highlighting the risk of a one-size-
fits-all approach (Loch, 2000; Phillips et al., 2006; Benner and Tushman, 2003; Shenhar
and Dvir, 1996). The literature on real options reasoning, which can be regarded as the
theoretical framework underlying the staging of innovation projects, has only recently
identified firm-specific factors as possible determinants of performance heterogeneity
across firms (Driouchi and Bennett, 2012; Tong and Reuer, 2006, 2007). Neglecting
these firm-specific factors might explain why existing studies often lead to incomplete
or conflicting conclusions (Driouchi and Bennett, 2012). The current study intends to
fill this gap by explicitly taking into account resource availability and the radicalness of
envisaged innovations when examining the impact of staged project management.
2.1. Staging innovation projects
As the outcome of innovation projects is often highly uncertain, academics and practi-
tioners have been searching for ways to tackle this uncertainty. The organization and
financing of innovation projects in different stages has been widely proposed as the pre-
eminent way of managing and even benefiting from uncertain opportunities while keeping
costs under control. The staging of innovation projects involves “a conceptual and oper-
ational map for moving new product projects from idea to launch and beyond” (Cooper,
2008, pp. 214). It comprises a series of stages where at the end of each stage a decision
is made to either abandon or continue with the project. Organizing the innovation pro-
cess in stages makes the size of an investment inversely proportional to the investment’s
uncertainty. At early stages, when uncertainty regarding the technical and commercial
viability of the innovation project is typically high, investments are relatively limited.
As uncertainty is reduced, the projects that have not been killed advance to subsequent
stages where funding increases (Summers and Scherpereel, 2008).
The theoretical underpinning for the staging of innovation projects can be found in real
options theory. This theory is concerned with investments in real assets with a structure
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similar to that of financial options (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
As Cooper (2008, pp. 214) points out, organizing innovation projects in stages “is very
similar to [...] buying a series of options on an investment. Initially, one purchases an
option for a small amount of money, then does some due diligence, and finally decides
whether or not to continue to invest”. This results in a sequence of smaller irreversible
investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), which offers an alternative to traditional upfront
investment. As pointed out by McGrath (1999), staging investments can lower the cost
of mistakes. “If investments are staged so that expenditures end under poor conditions,
losses can be contained. The cost of failure, in other words, is limited to the cost of
creating the real option, less any remaining option value” (McGrath, 1999, pp. 14). This
freedom to abandon an unsuccessful innovation project at low cost frees up financial
resources which would otherwise be spent on the continuation of the project. These
additional resources can be invested in other more promising innovation projects, thereby
contributing to the innovation output of the firm. In addition, there is also value in
waiting to invest (McDonald and Siegel, 1986). Even if the technical development of a
product is successful, the market may not be ready yet. The option to wait longer before
commercializing the product can create higher sales in the longer turn. In general, a
staged approach allows firms to postpone commitment until a substantial portion of the
uncertainty about the opportunity has been resolved (Adner and Levinthal, 2004). Given
the value of abandonment and the value of waiting inherent to staging of innovation
projects, we posit that an additional investment in innovation projects contributes to
innovation output more if these projects are organized in stages. In other words:
H1: Staged project management has a positive moderating effect on the
relationship between innovation inputs (i.e., innovation expenditures) and
innovation outputs (i.e., sales from new products).
2.2. Resource availability
A first possible contingency factor identified in the literature is resource availability.
In staged innovation projects, the project team has a stipulated budget at its disposal
to make it to the first milestone. If this milestone is not met with the given budget,
the project is killed. A study by Oorschot et al. (2010) indicates that a small increase
in early project stage investment can have a substantial impact on overall innovation
success. Under tight budget constraints, projects that could eventually become successful
are not seldom cut at a too early stage. Lower budgets cause delays in assembling the
project team and hence lead to temporary understaffing, which in turn results in a higher
number of undetected errors and an increased need for rework. Consequently, projects do
not reach their initial milestones and are abandoned. Slightly relaxing budget constraints
avoids these problems and leads to an increased accomplishment of initial milestones as
well as a reduction in overall project costs.
In addition, the literature suggests that firms must be equipped with resource-costly
systems and capabilities to detect and develop real options before actually being able
to benefit from a real options approach. First, identifying and developing different
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options requires sufficient financial and human resources. If a project is abandoned,
the company needs to search its reserve of alternative option prospects (Kogut, 1989;
Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Rangan, 1998). Furthermore, firms need to appropriate
operational routines to avoid being caught in the pitfalls of real options reasoning, such
as suboptimal decision-making due to social ties and cognitive biases (Coff and Laverty,
2001) and the tendency to escalate commitment in the face of abandonment (Carr, 2002;
Adner, 2007; Adner and Levinthal, 2004). Finally, resource availability and learning
capabilities are crucial for absorbing the full potential of firms’ option reserves (Barnett,
2008; Miller, 2002; Miller and Arikan, 2004). As Tong and Reuer (2007) point out,
real options reasoning generally leads to increased marginal costs from both greater
coordination complexity and greater information load born by managers. For example,
the new product development literature posits that staging the innovation process may
distance the final product from the original idea if information dependencies are not
managed well (Crawford and Di Benedetto, 2008). Project managers are assumed to
accumulate competently all relevant information as a new product progresses through
the stages (Hart et al., 2003; Huber, 1991; Song et al., 2007). Resource-constrained firms
may not have the financial and human capabilities to manage these complex processes.
As the literature suggests that companies with fewer financial resources are more
likely to exit potentially projects, and are insufficiently staffed to deal with the greater
complexity inherent to staging innovation projects, we hypothesize they generally benefit
less from staging their innovation projects. In other words:
H2: The moderating effect of staging innovation projects is lower for resource-
constrained firms than for resource-abundant firms.
2.3. Radicalness of envisaged innovations
As pointed out by Klingebiel and Rammer (2014), firms differ with respect to the rad-
icalness of the new products they intend to develop. In particular, a distinction can
be made between continuous or incremental innovations on the one hand, and radical
innovations on the other hand. Incremental innovations include the improvement of
existing technologies and products, whereas radical innovations encompass the creation
of completely new products and competencies (Zaltman et al., 1973; Abernathy and
Utterback, 1987; Dewar and Dutton, 1986). While some companies focus on projects
that are closely related to their existing products and capabilities, others put more effort
into the development of radical innovations that are further apart from their existing
knowledge base (Hauser et al., 2006; Shane and Ulrich, 2004). We posit that a firm’s
focus on incremental versus radical innovations is an important contingency factor for
the staging of innovation projects.
Staged project management requires the upfront identification of milestones and cri-
teria for continuation or abandonment. This works well when projects have a fixed
technical agenda and fixed target market (Adner and Levinthal, 2004), and when com-
mercialization issues and the development of institutional structures can be considered
sequential to technological issues, as is the case for continuous or incremental innovations
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(Garud et al., 1998). When more radical product innovations are envisaged, discovering
a wide variety of alternatives even in the face of initial negative results becomes crucial.
Although a project may not meet its initial expectations, it can lead to the discovery of
unanticipated possibilities and thereby enable the development of radical innovations.
Staged project management with predetermined milestones and criteria does not seem
appropriate for the development of this type of radical innovations, where goals are often
unclear. Under such circumstances, a more experimental approach may be preferable,
where deliverables are flexible and detours are possible (Eisendardt and Tabrizi, 1995).
As Adner and Levinthal (2004, pp. 77) put it, “imposing rigid criteria for abandonment
may result in the underutilization of discoveries made in the context of initiatives that
are failures with respect to their initial agenda but that introduce promising possibilities
not previously imagined”. We therefore argue that the moderating effect of staging in-
novation projects depends on whether a firms intends to develop incremental or radical
innovations. In other words:
H3: The moderating effect of staged project management is lower for firms
envisaging radical innovations than for firms envisaging incremental innova-
tions.
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION
3.1. Sample
The Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) is an annually conducted innovation survey
of German firms and part of the pan-European Community Innovation Survey (CIS).
Each year, a number of questions not included in the standard CIS instrument is added
for purposes of academic research, such as the items used in this article. The MIP is a
stratified (according to sector, size class and region) random sample that complies to the
guidelines and definitions of the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) for surveys on innovation
activities. The MIP covers all production sectors (sections B, C, D, E according to
the NACE Rev. 2.0 classification) and a large number of service sector (H, J, K, N,
division 46) including business-related services (divisions 69, 70.2, 73, 74), architecture
and engineering (71), and research and development (72). The use of CIS data has
a long-standing tradition in economics of innovation (Cre´pon et al., 1998; Cassiman
and Veugelers, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2011; Czarnitzki and
Hottenrott, 2011b; Peters et al., 2013). Recent contributions show an increased attention
also by management scholars (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010, 2011;
Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014).
Items relevant to our research hypotheses are contained in the 2009 (covering the years
2006 until 2008) and 2011 (2008 until 2010) waves of the MIP. The gross samples include
35, 195 (2009) and 35, 531 (2011) firms; net response rates (adjusted for neutral losses)
amount to 22.3% (2009) and 23.6% (2011), leading to 7, 061 (2009) and 6, 851 (2011)
responses, respectively. Compared to other national contributions to the CIS, participa-
tion in Germany is rather low, which can mainly be explained by the fact that survey
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
New Product Sales (MM AC) 23.42 407.45 0 24191
Innovation Intensity (MM AC per empl.) 0.0102 0.0171 0 0.1025
Firm Size (number of employees) 393.7 3694.08 1 186000
Firm Age 31.56 36.9 1 509
Projects† 15.41 89.49 1 4598
Credit Rating‡ 223.4 44.22 100 500
Share of Graduates 0.26 0.27 0 1
Staged† 0.62 0 1
Radicalness† 0.34 0 1
Process Innovation† 0.61 0 1
Group† 0.06 0 1
Sample size: N = 3853
† Variables that cover a period of t until t− 2, ‡ credit rating in period t− 1
participation is not mandatory unlike in other European countries, while the question-
naire is significantly longer and more complex. To this end, the survey is accompanied
by an extensive non-response analysis through individual telephone interviews compared
to the main survey instrument, which allows the respondents to choose between a mail
or online questionnaire. Due to its extensive scope, with items that go beyond the stan-
dard catalog of CIS questions, annual surveys, and a careful quality control, the MIP
data is generally considered to be of high quality (Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014). We
drop firms that do not report any kinds of innovation activities (including the attempt
to innovate) from the full sample since our analysis is concerned with the question of
how firms that have already decided to engage in innovation activities organize this pro-
cess. The estimation sample that has been corrected for missing values contains 3, 853
observations, i.e., 2, 122 observations from the 2009 wave and 1, 731 observations from
the 2011 wave.
3.2. Main variables
We measure firms’ innovation performance as the absolute number of sales that are
achieved with new products (New Product Sales) in a given year. To classify a product
as “new”, it must be a product or service that is newly introduced, or its components
or basic characteristics need to be significantly improved. Firms in our sample report
average sales of 23.4 million euros stemming from new products (see Table 1). The
distribution is substantially right-skewed and ranges from zero up to more than 24 billion
euros. The concept of New Product Sales as an outcome measure is well-established in
the literature (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014; Cappelli et al.,
2014).
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The total amount of expenditures for innovation activities by a firm is our main
measure of input to the innovation process. It covers all types of R&D and basic research
(including expenditures for personnel, capital and contract R&D) as well as expenditures
in later stages of the innovation process, such as for training and market preparation
(OECD, 2005, Section 4.1). We scale expenditures by the number of employees to arrive
at a measure (Innovation Intensity) that adjusts for mere size effects. To reduce noise due
to outliers and reporting mistakes, we winsorize observations above the 99% quantile.
Sample firms spend an average of 10, 235 euro per employee and year on innovation
activities.
The questionnaire asks firms whether they allocate the majority of funds for innova-
tion projects at the beginning of a project or in stages. The wording of the question
specifically mentions that the staged allocation could be organized along milestones. We
conceptualize this information as a dummy variable (Staged) that takes on the value one
if firms finance their innovation projects in stages and zero otherwise. Such a staging
of innovation projects is reported by 62% of the firms. Respondents are additionally
asked how many steps such a process usually involves. On average this number lies
slightly above four. However, due to a particularly low response rate and concerns
about measurement error for this specific item, we rely solely on the binary indicator in
the subsequent analysis.
To assess the availability of financial resources, we take advantage of a standardized
credit rating index (Credit Rating) for German firms that is provided by Creditreform,
the largest credit rating agency in Germany (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011b). Czar-
nitzki and Hottenrott (2011a) describe the underlying methodology in a detailed way.
The index provides data about the creditworthiness of not only large publicly listed
companies but also small and medium sized firms that comprise more than 80% of
the observations in our sample. Creditreform ratings are based on a company’s general
financial situation and past payment history as well as on individual assessment by Cred-
itreform’s local staff. This information is provided to banks in order to evaluate credit
default risks as well as to other market participants, e.g., suppliers that want to screen
their potential partners before engaging in a business relationship. The index ranges
from 100 (excellent rating) to 600 (worst rating). A decrease in the integer valued index
thus denotes an ameliorated creditworthiness. We drop firms with a rating higher than
500 from the analysis since this case implies severe financial trouble that is equivalent
to bankruptcy.
In order to examine the moderating effect of radicalness, we draw on self-reported
information about the goals that companies pursue with their innovation activities (see
examples by Leiponen and Helfat, 2010; Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014). In the MIP,
firms are asked to rate the importance of several innovation objectives on a 4-point
Likert scale, where response categories range from not relevant, coded as 0, to highly
relevant, coded as 3. In line with Klingebiel and Rammer (2014), we use firms’ ratings
of the two objectives to (1) increase the range of products and to (2) enter new markets
to construct a binary indicator (Radicalness). In particular, we only regard firms with
a compound score of 6, i.e., firms that attribute a high relevance to both objectives, as
envisaging radical innovations.
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The respective question is only included in the 2009 wave of the survey. However, we
argue that a firm’s focus on incremental versus more radical innovations is stable in the
short-run. As explained by Lavie and Rosenkopf (2014), path dependencies reinforce
either exploration or exploitation activities. As a result, firms developing incremental
innovations are likely to do more incremental innovation in the future; while firms devel-
oping more radical innovations are likely to keep up these radical innovation activities.
We therefore carry forward the observed Radicalness for firms that appear in both waves.
This is the case for about one third of the observations in the 2011 wave, which allows us
to extend our sample from the 2009 wave with an additional number of 605 observations,
thereby increasing statistical power. In total, 34% of firms are envisaging more radical
innovations.
3.3. Control variables and timing
To control for confounding influences, we include other firm level characteristics in our
empirical specification. Innovation performance is likely to be influenced by size and
experience effects (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008), measured
by the number of employees (Firm Size), as well as the firm’s age (Firm Age). The
average firm in the sample has 394 employees and is 32 years old. To make project
portfolios comparable across firms, we control for the total number of innovation projects
(Projects)1. Firms in the sample conducted an average number of 15 projects within
a period of three years. In addition, the success of innovation activities is contingent
on a firm’s internal capability to exploit new knowledge and technologies (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990). We account for this by incorporating the firm’s share of employees
that hold an academic degree (Share of Graduates). At the same time, this measure
controls for the quality of labor input. About 26% of the sample firms’ employees hold
a university degree. Although our analysis is concerned with new product development,
we incorporate a variable representing whether firms introduced a Process Innovation
during the prior period (which applies to 61% of the sample firms) to control for firms’
success with this other class of innovation activities. A dummy variable equal to one if a
firm is part of an enterprise group (Group), which is the case for 6% of the firms in the
sample, controls for differences in governance structure. Summary statistics for variables
in levels are reported in Table 1. Finally we construct a set of 25 industry dummies based
on the two-digit NACE (Rev. 2.0) categories and a time dummy, representing the survey
waves, to control for time effects (see Table 5 in the Appendix).
Given the skewed distribution of several variables, namely New Product Sales, Innova-
tion Intensity, Firm Size, Firm Age, and Projects, we transformed them logarithmically.
Table 6 (Appendix) depicts the correlation structure of the final variables as used in
the analysis. Although we have information from two survey waves, we are not able
to construct a balanced panel data set of satisfactory size. Thus, we need to rely on
pooled cross-section methods (see examples by Laursen and Salter, 2006; Klingebiel and
1The Oslo manual makes a distinction between R&D and innovation activities (OECD, 2005, Section
2.5). Pure R&D activities are a subset of innovation activities, and the number of Projects hence
includes, but is not limited to, pure R&D projects.
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Rammer, 2014; Cappelli et al., 2014). Fortunately, CIS data has the advantage that
many variables cover a period of three years before the survey year (t until t − 2, with
survey year being t + 1). New Product Sales, i.e., the dependent variable, is measured
at the end of this period (in t) which therefore reduces simultaneity and allows for a
more realistic timing of the underlying relationship. Table 1 shows that this time lag is
present for the majority of variables in our dataset.
The continuous variables Innovation Intensity and Firm Size, however, are both mea-
sured in t and due to the lack of overlap between waves, we are not able to incorporate
lagged values. In this case, one solution would be to rely on data extrapolation. Such an
out-of-sample imputation relies on strong assumptions about missing variables that we
are uncomfortable with. In consonance with other researchers (Hussinger, 2008; Peters
et al., 2013; Cappelli et al., 2014), we rather acknowledge an imperfect timing between
innovation expenditures and innovation outcome. To fully analyze the time structure
of when effects materialize, one would need to rely on much more detailed longitudinal
data than we have at hand2. This should be born in mind for the interpretation of our
results. Fortunately, for the credit rating index longitudinal data is sufficiently available,
which enables us to use a one-year time lag for this variable.
3.4. Estimation
We estimate the link between staged project management and innovation performance
with a log-log specification, which has the convenient feature that regression coefficients
can be interpreted as elasticities. Authors in previous studies (Laursen and Salter, 2006;
Leiponen and Helfat, 2010, 2011; Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014) often rely on limited de-
pendent variable models, namely a Tobit type I regression (Tobin, 1958; Amemiya, 1985),
because they recognize the non-negativity of sales with new products. In agreement with
Angrist and Pischke (2009), we break with this tradition as we do not make sense of a
latent variable interpretation with a separate censoring mechanism that forces negative
sales to be zero. Rather we think that zeros occur naturally in this setting. Another
justification for the Tobit model is sometimes provided by a hurdle model interpretation
(Cragg, 1971). Here, the censoring point is thought as a threshold of “participation”
which is modeled by a separate probabilistic process. Excess zeros (e.g., relative to the
likelihood of a normal distribution) occur because a part of the sample is simply reluctant
to engage in any innovation activities. We think that such a two-part approach is not
appropriate for our application either as some form of innovation activity is a necessary
condition to appear in our sample. In addition, we do not require fitted values to satisfy
boundary conditions at the lower ends of the distribution, since we are not interested in
effects that appear in certain distributional ranges of the dependent variable. Estimation
2The longitudinal pattern of all observations in the MIP between 2006 and 2010 is as follows. 25, 382
firms are observed, with a medium number of 3 year observations per firm. 22.6% of these firms
responded in all 5 consecutive years. Other firms show a more unsteady response pattern. The
innovation intensity attains a mean value of 0.01, which approximates the average in our estimation
sample. The standard deviation amounts to 0.0221 between firms, and 0.0102 within firms, over
time.
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by ordinary least squares, in contrast, conveniently allows to incorporate cluster-robust
standard errors (clustered at the firm level) which is advisable when analyzing survey
data considering that some firms appear in both survey waves.
In our baseline model, we regress New Product Sales on Innovation Intensity interacted
with Staged (Staged × Inn. Int.). This has the conceptual advantage that staging
innovation projects, as a project management paradigm, can only be complementary
to an actual innovation budget. It enhances the efficiency of allocated resources, yet
it does not increase innovation outcomes by itself. Interpreting an effect of the Staged
dummy alone would fall short of this aspect. In a next step, we augment the full sample
estimation with a split sample analysis. To measure the moderating effect of resource
availability, we split the sample at a value of the credit rating index being equal to
220, which corresponds to the sample median. It should be mentioned however, that
this value indicates still a rather good rating and firms below but close to the threshold
cannot be seen as severely financially troubled. A second sample split is done according
to the radicalness of the firm’s envisaged innovations. In a last step, we interact these
two dichotomous variables to generate four mutually exclusive categories (strong credit
rating paired with the intent to develop incremental innovations, strong credit rating
paired with the intent to develop radical innovations, weak credit rating paired with the
intent to develop incremental innovations, and weak credit rating paired with the intent
to develop radical innovations).
4. RESULTS
Column 1 in Table 2 shows the regression results for the full sample of firms. Innovation
Intensity (log), Firm Size (log) and Share of Graduates all have a positive effect on New
Product Sales (log). These findings are consistent with recent CIS studies (Klingebiel
and Rammer, 2014; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and
Helfat, 2010). Firms that belong to a Group and that have more Projects have higher
New Product Sales (log). The interaction term of Staged and Innovation Intensity (log)
has no significant effect on New Product Sales (log). Hypothesis 1 is hence not confirmed
for the full sample. We do however find a positive main effect of Staged on New Product
Sales (log).
The results become more interesting when the sample is split according to Credit
Rating and Radicalness. Column 2 in Table 2 contains the regression results for the
subsample of firms with a strong Credit Rating (i.e., with a credit rating index below 220).
The positive effects of Innovation Intensity (log), Firm Size (log), Share of Graduates,
Projects, as well as the positive main effect of Staged remain. In addition, the interaction
term of Staged and Innovation Intensity (log) now has a significantly positive effect
on New Product Sales (log). These results are strikingly different from those for the
subsample of firms with a weak Credit Rating (i.e., with a credit rating index equal
to or above 220; see Column 3 in Table 2). For the subsample of resource-constrained
firms, we find neither a significant main effect of Staged nor a significant interaction
term of Staged and Innovation Intensity (log) on New Product Sales (log). These results
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Table 2: Innovation Performance
New Product Sales (log):
Full Sample: Credit Rating: Radicalness:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Staged 0.856∗∗∗ 1.401∗∗ 0.410 0.0430 1.394∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.548) (0.404) (0.575) (0.525)
Innovation Intensity (log) 0.156∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.0369) (0.0612) (0.0475) (0.0830) (0.0618)
Staged × Inn. Int. (log) 0.0854 0.190∗∗ -0.0138 0.00126 0.177∗∗
(0.0540) (0.0905) (0.0663) (0.102) (0.0861)
Projects (log) 0.836∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗
(0.0622) (0.0850) (0.0926) (0.108) (0.0971)
Firm Size (log) 0.659∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗
(0.0474) (0.0710) (0.0682) (0.0858) (0.0713)
Firm Age (log) -0.0574 0.0923 -0.195∗∗ -0.198∗ 0.0191
(0.0648) (0.110) (0.0984) (0.118) (0.0983)
Share of Graduates 1.400∗∗∗ 1.475∗∗∗ 1.486∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗ 1.115∗∗
(0.270) (0.566) (0.314) (0.434) (0.441)
Process Innovation -0.0216 -0.102 0.0420 -0.0704 -0.0101
(0.117) (0.192) (0.153) (0.222) (0.179)
Group 0.578∗∗ 0.384 0.564 0.340 0.831∗
(0.262) (0.360) (0.406) (0.394) (0.431)
Constant -5.314∗∗∗ -6.488∗∗∗ -4.275∗∗∗ -5.585∗∗∗ -5.118∗∗∗
(0.810) (1.187) (1.316) (1.280) (1.584)
Observations 3853 1795 1872 937 1790
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.318 0.262 0.368 0.293
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Industry and time dummies included. Sample split: (2) strong credit rating, (3) weak credit rating,
(4) envisaging radical innovations, (5) envisaging incremental innovations
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confirm Hypothesis 2 that the moderating effect of staging innovation projects is lower
for resource-constrained firms than for resource-abundant firms.
To assess the validity of Hypothesis 3, we use the binary variable Radicalness to split
the sample into a subsample of firms that envisage more radical innovations (Column
4 in Table 2) and a subsample of firms that have continuous or incremental innovation
aspirations (Column 5 in Table 2). We again find that Innovation Intensity (log), Firm
Size (log), Share of Graduates, and Projects have a significant positive effect on New
Product Sales (log) for both subsamples. However, while Staged has a positive main
effect and a positive interaction effect for the subsample of firms with incremental inno-
vation aspirations, these effects are absent for the subset of firms envisaging more radical
innovations. These results confirm Hypothesis 3 that the moderating effect of staging
innovation projects is lower for firms envisaging more radical innovations.
Table 3 interacts the sample splits according to Credit Rating and to Radicalness with
each other. The results show that the positive main effect and the positive moderating
effect of Staged only hold for the subset of firms having better credit ratings than the
median firm and that aspire continuous or incremental innovations (Column 3 in Table
3). For all other subsamples, no significant effect of Staged, neither direct nor moderating,
on New Product Sales (log) is found.
4.1. Robustness checks
We conduct several robustness checks for our results. For the sake of brevity they are
not reported but available upon request to the authors. To arrive at the Radicalness
indicator, we impute values for the 2011 wave when firms are observed in both waves.
This approach allows us to expand our sample and gain statistical power. To check
the sensitivity of our results to this procedure, we estimate the same specification as
presented in Table 2 with the 2009 wave only. Despite the reduced sample size, our
results remain robust.
A sample split at the median of Credit Rating is an arbitrary choice. The distribution
of the index has a lot of mass at intermediate values of the support, which results in a
threshold that still corresponds to a comparatively good rating. As a robustness check,
and to further differentiate resource-constrained from resource-abundant firms, we refine
the division in subsamples according to the 33% and 66% quantile of Credit Rating.
The estimated interaction terms (Staged, Staged × Inn. Int.) are jointly significant in
the samples of firms with good (minimum until 33% quantile) and intermediate (33%
until 66% quantile) rankings. Point estimates increase over the three subsamples, which
suggests a monotone relationship between resource availability and the success of staging
innovation projects.
Due to a high correlation between Firm Size and Projects (0.47 in logarithms), one
might be concerned about collinearity. If the number of innovation projects is scaled
by firm sales, to arrive at a measure that is orthogonal to firm size, results remain
virtually identical. We thus stick to the previous specification as it offers a more natural
interpretation.
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Table 3: Interacted Categories
New Product Sales (log):
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Staged 0.251 0.336 1.868∗∗ 0.973
(1.078) (0.690) (0.839) (0.691)
Innovation Intensity (log) 0.245 0.0968 0.214∗∗ 0.155∗∗
(0.166) (0.0961) (0.108) (0.0773)
Staged × Inn. Int. (log) 0.0382 -0.00952 0.272∗∗ 0.0853
(0.194) (0.120) (0.138) (0.114)
Projects (log) 0.507∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.159) (0.135) (0.139)
Firm Size (log) 1.035∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.132) (0.107) (0.103)
Firm Age (log) -0.134 -0.300 0.132 -0.186
(0.195) (0.184) (0.158) (0.158)
Share of Graduates 0.257 1.520∗∗∗ 0.889 1.480∗∗∗
(0.933) (0.539) (0.874) (0.512)
Process Innovation 0.251 -0.256 -0.323 0.153
(0.404) (0.278) (0.274) (0.248)
Group -0.430 1.053∗ 0.562 0.870
(0.604) (0.633) (0.557) (0.669)
Constant -4.237∗∗∗ -8.355∗∗∗ -6.215∗∗∗ -1.850∗∗∗
(1.283) (2.722) (1.984) (0.707)
Observations 423 473 875 835
Adjusted R2 0.378 0.294 0.307 0.251
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Industry and time dummies included. Sample split: (1) envisaging radical in-
novations and strong credit rating, (2) envisaging radical innovations and weak
credit rating, (3) envisaging incremental innovations and strong credit rating,
(4) envisaging incremental innovations and weak credit rating
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Eventually, we address two aspects in which we depart from the empirical strategy in
previous related studies. Klingebiel and Rammer (2014) construct a variable measuring
the radicalness of a firms’ envisaged innovations with the same data on innovation ob-
jectives as we do. They also rely on the compound score of the two objectives to enter
new markets and to expand into new product categories. However, they omit firms from
the analysis if scores of the individual items (0 to 3) sum up to 5. In agreement with
the robustness checks for their results, we find no sensitivity to this alternative con-
ceptualization. Furthermore, we refer to the previous discussion of limited dependent
variable models by reestimating our specification with a Tobit type I model. As point
estimates remain close to our original results, we are confident about the robustness of
our analysis.
4.2. Additional insights into resource-abundant and resource-constrained
firms
In the literature background section, we hypothesized that companies with less financial
resources generally benefit less from staging their innovation projects. While the results
presented above confirm our hypothesis, the MIP also offers some possibilities to look
deeper into the mechanisms behind this relationship. In line with the literature, we
argue that staged project management has an effect on the project portfolio of a firm. In
particular, staged project management potentially allows firms to reap the option values
of postponing and abandoning projects. By investigating whether firms that successfully
apply the staging of innovation projects differ from their unsuccessful counterparts with
respect to postponing and abandoning projects, we can further shed light on the influence
of innovation project management on innovation output. We conduct this analysis for the
sample split according to firms’ credit rating because resource-constrained firms might
be particularly prone to non-optimal decisions of project abandonment as discussed in
the literature background section above.
We make use of additional questions in the two waves of the MIP. In particular, the
survey asks respondents to provide more detailed information about the total number
of innovation projects in the last three years and to differentiate between successful
projects (Successfully Completed Projects), projects that have been discontinued before
completion (Abandoned Projects), and projects that are still ongoing (Ongoing Projects).
Category averages, relative to a firm’s total number of innovation projects, are 50%
successfully completed, 8% abandoned, and 40% ongoing projects. Note that these
numbers do not necessarily need to add up to one because of missing values in some
response categories. By looking at whether staged project management has a different
effect on the relative shares of successfully completed, abandoned, and ongoing projects
in the portfolio of resource-abundant versus resource-constrained firms, we can gain a
better understanding of why these two types of firms do not benefit equally from staging
innovation projects.
For this purpose, we estimate a fractional response model (Papke and Wooldridge,
1996), again applying a sample split at the median of Credit Rating. This model assumes
a set of linear predictors (explanatory variables) to be related to the conditional mean
16
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of the data through a logistic link function. It is therefore consistent with dependent
variables that solely take on values between zero and one. Furthermore, as the log-
likelihood for the fractional response model is part of the linear exponential family, the
approach is robust to distributional misspecification as long as the conditional mean is
correctly specified (Gourieroux et al., 1984). We estimate the model by GLM (Nelder
and Wedderburn, 1972) but rely again on cluster-robust inference since GLM standard
errors will be inconsistent due to repeated observations of the same firm in the sample
(Hardin and Hilbe, 2012). As the response rate for these respective items is significantly
lower than for the variables used in our main specification, the estimation sample is
reduced by more than 50%.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 show that the use of a staged project management approach
is associated with a significantly lower share of successfully completed projects, for both
firms with strong and for firms with weak credit ratings. At the same time, one can
observe an increased share of abandoned projects for firms with weak credit ratings
(Column 4 in Table 4). Firms with strong credit ratings do not abandon a higher share
of projects when using staged project management. Instead, they show a high share of
projects that are still ongoing.
5. DISCUSSION
The commercialization of new products and services is an essential determinant of long-
run survival in a dynamic economic environment. However, due to technological and
market uncertainties, only a fraction of a firm’s innovation projects turns into a true
commercial success. In times of budgetary restrictions, expenditures on innovation are
under pressure and firms have to think carefully about how to manage their innovation
projects in order to maximize the return on investment. By empirically demonstrating
the effect of staged project management on sales from new products, this article advances
our understanding of the determinants of firms’ innovation performance. The results
show that this effect depends heavily on firms’ characteristics and ambitions, in particular
on the resources the firm has at its disposal, and on whether it aspires incremental or
more radical innovations. As discussed below, these findings have implications for real
options reasoning and innovation project management.
We hypothesized a moderating effect of staged project management, in the sense that
the management of innovation projects in stages increases the effect of innovation inputs
(i.e., innovation expenditures) on innovation outputs (i.e., sales from new products).
Our empirical results show this moderating effect to be highly dependent on whether
or not a firm envisages radical innovations that increase the firm’s product range and
allow it to enter new markets. Staging innovation projects requires the upfront identifi-
cation of milestones and criteria for continuation or abandonment. When firms envisage
incremental or continuous innovations, projects have a fixed technical agenda and fixed
target market (Adner and Levinthal, 2004). Questions of commercialization and the de-
velopment of institutional structures can be considered sequential to technological issues
(Garud et al., 1998). For this type of incremental innovation projects, it is possible to
identify appropriate milestones and exit criteria upfront. By using these milestones and
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criteria, firms become more successful at developing incremental innovations. Staged
project management thus enhances the effectiveness of innovation investments to gener-
ate sales from incremental or continuous innovations.
However, when more radical product innovations are envisaged, our results show no
effect of staged project management on innovation performance. Staged innovation
projects, with predetermined milestones and criteria, are not beneficial for the devel-
opment of this type of radical innovations, where goals are often unclear. A project
may not meet its initial expectations, but it can nevertheless lead to the discovery of
unanticipated possibilities and thereby enable the development of radical innovations
in subsequent projects (Phillips et al., 2006). Although our research set-up does not
allow for an explicit test, these results suggest that for radical innovation projects a
more experimental approach with flexible deliverables and possible detours is preferable
(Eisendardt and Tabrizi, 1995). This implies that firms should adapt their project man-
agement approach depending on the radical or incremental character of their envisaged
innovations.
Furthermore, our study highlights the important role of resource-availability for the
effective implementation of a staged project management approach. While the approach
allows resource-abundant firms to generate higher sales from investments in innovation,
this effect does not occur for firms that have fewer resources at their disposal. These
results provide initial support for the argumentation that, because they are more likely to
exit potentially promising projects, and because they are less equipped to deal with the
greater complexity inherent to staging innovation projects, companies with less financial
resources generally benefit less from staging their innovation projects.
Our data also allow us to investigate the role of innovation project management in more
detail. By looking at whether staged project management is associated with different
portfolio shares of successfully completed, abandoned, and ongoing projects in resource-
abundant versus resource constrained firms, we gain a better understanding of why these
two types of firms do not benefit equally from staged project management. Within the
covered period, the share of successfully completed projects of resource-abundant firms is
reduced to the advantage of ongoing projects, while the proportion of abandoned projects
remains unaltered. This result suggests that resource-abundant firms benefit from staged
project management not because it helps them to abandon unpromising projects, but
because it allows them to delay project decisions until additional information necessary
for informed decision making becomes available. Hence, they exercise the option value
of waiting and benefit from the flexibility to adjust their innovation strategy to changing
economic conditions. As for resource-constrained firms, our results demonstrate that
they are inclined to cut away more projects when using staged project management. We
again find a decreased share of successfully completed projects, which are now, however,
accompanied by an increased proportion of abandoned projects. This result implies that
resource-constrained firms shift resources and focus on fewer projects when applying a
staged approach. Yet, it is surprising that their sales figures stemming from innovative
products do not benefit from this reallocation of resources.
Our findings on project continuation and abandonment rates contribute to the liter-
ature on real options reasoning. Several authors have argued that to truly understand
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the value of real options reasoning, more insight into the mechanisms underlying the
approach is needed. Driouchi and Bennett (2012), for example, point out that because
of the reluctance of firms to disclose their real options activities, there is no particular
study which explicitly inspects the effect of real options decision-making on performance.
There is some evidence of the positive impact of staged project management on outcomes
of superior new products (Davis, 2002; Soh et al., 2004), but very little is done to open
this “black box” and to shape our understanding of the mechanisms at play (Ettlie and
Elsenbach, 2007). Adner and Levinthal (2004) argue that, in order to truly understand
the impact of real options reasoning, one should move beyond studying whether projects
are on average more profitable in firms using real options, and “examine the way in which
the portfolio is adjusted over time and, in particular, firms’ approaches to abandonment”
(Adner and Levinthal, 2004, pp. 83).
It is generally believed that the value of applying real options reasoning results from
two distinct mechanisms: (1) the possibility to delay project decisions until uncertainty
is reduced, and (2) the possibility to abandon unsuccessful projects and reinvest the
budget into other more promising projects. We observe that the use of a staged project
management approach in resource-abundant firms is associated with a decreased share of
successfully completed projects to the advantage of ongoing projects, while keeping the
proportion of abandoned projects stable. Resource-abundant firms hence use the staged
approach mainly to capture the value inherent in waiting. They are able to use this
additional flexibility to their advantage in dealing with the large uncertainties related
to innovation projects, that only slowly resolve over time. The performance premium of
innovation expenditures in generating sales from new products for this group underpins
this interpretation. By contrast, resource-constrained firms are inclined to cut away
more projects when using staged project management. They use the approach mainly
to capture the value in abandoning. Compared to their counterparts with more resource
slack, they spend their, usually, smaller innovation budget on fewer projects. This
means that they concentrate their resources on seemingly more promising ventures when
applying staged project management. Looking at innovation performance, however, we
do not see that this additional focus is profitable. We infer from this finding that the
positive selection effect is outweighed by go-or-kill decisions that are made too early,
at stages where uncertainty is still high and informed decisions about the prospects in
terms of commercial success are still infeasible. The tight budgets that managers face
lead them to veer off course too soon rather than sitting out the gales associated with
their endeavor.
Overall, we find convincing evidence that staged project management has the potential
to unleash the value in delaying project decisions until more information becomes avail-
able. We also demonstrate that a staged project management approach allows certain
firms to abandon projects more easily, thereby concentrating the allocated funds, but
not necessarily improving innovation performance. Successfully exploiting the potential
of staging innovation projects in fostering innovation output thus requires perseverance.
Resource-constrained firms hoping to use a staged approach as a leverage for dynamism
and renewal may end up disappointed if they are unable to mobilize the necessary re-
sources to stay in the game until chances and risks become assessable.
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While the literature on real options reasoning is characterized by substantial debates
between “believers” and “non-believers” of real options reasoning and staged project
management, this article is one of the first to delineate under which conditions staged
project management is beneficial and under which conditions it is not. It thereby ac-
commodates a strong plea in the literature for a more contingent view on real options
reasoning (Driouchi and Bennett, 2012) and on project management (Loch, 2000; Phillips
et al., 2006; Biazzo, 2009). It empirically shows the value of staged project management
for resource-abundant firms envisaging incremental innovations. At the same time, it
demonstrates that the approach does not improve innovation performance if resources
are scarce or radical innovations are envisaged. By explicating these conditions empiri-
cally, this article highlights the risk of a one-size-fits-all approach to innovation project
management. It also allows the literature to advance beyond the mere discussion on
whether or not real options reasoning and staged project management make sense. In
particular, it shifts the focus for further research and theoretical development to (1)
studying the phenomenon in the contexts in which it is proven relevant, i.e., in resource-
abundant firms with modest innovation ambitions, and (2) investigating more in-depth
why real options reasoning – and staged project management in particular – does not
work when resources are scarce or innovation ambitions are high.
6. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
The present study leaves room for improvement and further research. As noted above,
although the data were collected in two consecutive waves of the German CIS, the lim-
ited overlap between the two waves does not allow to exploit the panel structure of the
survey. Instead, cross-sectional analyses were performed. Even though the CIS has the
advantage that many variables cover a period of three years preceding the measurement
of our dependent variable, sales from new products, panel studies on this topic would
allow to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. A caveat is, however, that
such a study would rely on variation over time to identify the parameters of interest.
In our data, the between-variation of staged project management is larger than within
firms. Therefore, the use of a staged approach could also be seen as part of the unob-
served heterogeneity in productivity that the introduction of fixed effects would pick up.
Nonetheless, a longitudinal study allows for encompassing timing issues. The present
approach measures short-term performance only, but radical innovations may take more
time to materialize into sales. Research with a longer-term perspective could hence
measure the performance effect of staged project management more precisely, especially
when more radical innovations are envisaged.
We investigate the relationship between staged project management and innovation
output. We show that the effect is moderated by whether firms envisage incremental or
radical innovations and by the availability of financial resources. In a subsequent investi-
gation, we narrow down our analysis to the mechanisms through which a staged approach
can take a positive effect on performance within a firm. We compare resource-abundant
and resource-constrained firms because the literature suggests that there are potential
downsides of staged project management, which are likely to depend on firm character-
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istics such as resource availability. We find that the group that benefits from staging
innovation projects, i.e., resource-abundant firms, takes advantage of the waiting value
of real options to increase strategic flexibility. In the group in which staged project man-
agement remains ineffective, i.e., resource-constrained firms, resources are reallocated to
fewer projects, but there is no performance premium related to this additional focus.
Unfortunately, we do not have detailed data about the conducted projects and can only
rely on their number and status of completion within a firm. This is why we are un-
able to investigate the direct link between a firm’s project portfolio and its innovation
performance. Our analysis provides indication that staging innovation projects develops
its potential through an increased strategic flexibility in a firm’s project management,
resulting in longer project execution times, although this interpretation mainly remains
theory-based. We cannot exclude the possibility that there are other mechanisms that
create the effect or add to it. We thus would like to see future studies exploring the
interplay of real options reasoning, project execution and innovation performance in a
more detailed way. This research could study the decision to abandon projects, and
could examine whether and how some firms are able to capture both the value of wait-
ing and the value of abandoning at the same time, thereby illuminating the black box
even further.
The firm level perspective that this article takes is also restrictive in another sense.
While we capture the innovation ambition at the level of the organization as a whole,
individual firm projects will of course differ with respect to their innovative ambition,
i.e., whether they envisage developing incremental or more radical innovations. Projects
may also differ with respect to the quality of the ideas that are fed into them. Therefore,
future research might try to study the performance effect of staged project management
on a project level. This could provide insight into the different project management
approaches needed for incremental versus more radical innovations. In addition, quali-
tative research at the level of the firm could explore how companies can organize for a
combination of both types of innovation projects, and whether experimental approaches
with flexible deliverables and possible detours are indeed more valuable when radical
innovations are of concern.
7. CONCLUSION
If firms want to survive in the long run, the development and commercialization of
new products and services are essential. However, innovation processes are costly and
outcomes are often uncertain. This article investigates whether a staged approach to
innovation projects allows firms to reap more benefits from its expenditures for inno-
vation. We theorize that a staged approach affects the relationship between innovation
inputs and innovation output differently depending on project and firm characteristics.
In particular, we demonstrate that the moderating effect of a staged approach is ab-
sent for firms with more radical innovation aspirations, for which the predetermined
milestones and criteria inherent to staged innovation projects are inappropriate. In ad-
dition, we show that a staged approach has no effect when firms are resource-constrained.
We explain this finding further and demonstrate that resource-constrained firms are in-
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clined to cut away more projects when using staged project management. They use
the approach mainly to shift resources to fewer projects and to capture the value in
abandoning. Our findings suggest that this selection of projects is ineffective in stim-
ulating innovation output. We conclude that, because of budgetary pressure, resource-
constrained firms need to decide on abandonment at points of time when uncertainty is
insufficiently resolved. Resource-abundant firms, by contrast, are shown to delay more
projects when using a staged approach, thereby capturing the value inherent in waiting.
This paper accommodates a longstanding plea for a contingency approach in real
options reasoning and project management literature, by delineating the circumstances
under which the use of a staged project management approach can increase the benefits
from investments in innovation. Moreover, by looking into the actual project completion,
termination, and continuation rates, we contribute to theory on real options reasoning
in general, and in particular to insights regarding the value inherent in abandoning and
waiting.
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APPENDIX
Table 5: Industry and Time Dummies
Industries NACE (Rev. 2.0) Observations Proportion
Food/Beverages/Tobacco 10, 11, 12 134 3.48%
Textiles/Clothing 13, 14, 15 115 2.98%
Wood/Paper 16, 17 97 2.52%
Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals 20, 21 199 5.16%
Rubber/Plastics 22 118 3.06%
Glass/Ceramics/Concrete 23 98 2.54%
Metals 24, 25 289 7.50%
Electronics/Electrical 26, 27 467 12.12%
Machinery/Equipment 28, 33 421 10.93%
Vehicles 29, 30 128 3.32%
Furniture/Other Manufacturing 31, 32 133 3.45%
Energy/Mining/Oil 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 35 79 2.05%
Water Supply/Waste/Recycling 36, 37, 38, 39 135 3.50%
Wholesale Trade 46 79 2.05%
Transportation/Postal Services 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 79 148 3.84%
Printing/Publishing/Media 18, 58, 59, 60 170 4.41%
IT-Services/Telecommunications 61, 62, 63 271 7.03%
Financial Intermediation 64, 65, 66 111 2.88%
Consulting/Advertising 69, 70, 73 152 3.94%
Technical Engineering/R&D 71, 72 332 8.62%
Other Producer Services 74, 78, 80, 81, 82 121 3.14%
Construction 40, 41, 42, 43 14 0.36%
Retail Trade/Motor Vehicle Repair 45, 47 12 0.31%
Real Estate/Rental Services 68, 77 15 0.39%
Others 1, 56, 85, 86, 90 15 0.39%
Time (survey year):
2009 2122 55.07%
2011 1731 44.93%
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